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1. Introduction 
The commonest and simplest operational definition of consciousness is, the state of the 
patient’s awareness of self and environment and his responsiveness to external stimulation 
and inner need. Therefore, unconsciousness has the opposite meaning, that is, a state of 
unawareness of self and environment or a suspension of those mental activities by which 
people are made aware of themselves and their environment, coupled with a diminished 
responsiveness to environmental stimuli. Loss of consciousness can have many different 
causes, for example, stroke, traumatic brain injury, anesthesia, brainstem lesions and sleep, 
the various causes of unconsciousness primarily interfering with different brain functions. 
Clinically, impaired consciousness such as coma, vegetative state (VS) and minimally 
conscious state (MCS) is a very common manifestation in subjects with acquired brain 
injury. Unconsciousness does not always consist of a general suppression of the entire 
activity of the central nervous system. Depending on the actual cause(s), many functions, 
such as protective reflexes and various cognitive processes, can remain intact. The 
Management of such a patient in VS or MCS requires carefully reaching the correct 
diagnosis, pronouncing an evidence-based prognosis, and thoughtfully considering the 
medical, ethical, and legal elements of optimum treatment (Bernat, 2006).  
1.1. The anatomy and neurophysiology of unconsciousness 
The pioneering studies of Moruzzi and Magoun in the 1940s showed that, electrical 
stimulation of the medial midbrain tegmentum and adjacent areas just above this level 
caused a lightly anesthetized animal to become suddenly alert and its EEG to change 
correspondingly, i.e., to become “desynchronized,” in a manner identical to normal arousal 
by sensory stimuli. The sites at which stimulation led to arousal consisted of a series of 
 
Advances in Clinical Neurophysiology 32 
points extending from the nonspecific medial thalamic nuclei down through the caudal 
midbrain. These points were situated along where anatomists had referred to as the reticular 
system or formation. Fibers from the reticular formation ascend to the thalamus and project 
to various nonspecific thalamic nuclei. From these nuclei, there is a diffuse distribution of 
connections to all parts of the cerebral cortex. This whole system is concerned with 
consciousness and is known as the ascending reticular activating system (ARAS). Moreover, 
sensory stimulation has a double effect—it conveys information to the brain from somatic 
structures and the environment and also activates those parts of the nervous system on 
which the maintenance of consciousness depends. The cerebral cortex not only receives 
impulses from the ascending reticular activating system but also modulates this incoming 
information via corticofugal projections to the reticular formation (Ropper and Brown, 
2005). Intact consciousness requires normal functioning of the cortex of both cerebral 
hemispheres. 
Consciousness can be divided into two main components: arousal (wakefulness and 
vigilance) and awareness (awareness of the environment and the self). Arousal is supported 
by several brainstem neuronal populations that directly project to both thalamic and 
subcortical neurons. Awareness is dependent upon the integrity of the cerebral cortex and 
its subcortical connections. Each of its many parts is located, to some extent, in anatomically 
defined regions of the brain (Zeman, 2001). Impairments of consciousness may thus be 
caused either by the simultaneous impairment of function of both cerebral hemispheres, or 
by damage to the reticular formation in the brainstem, and/or to its ascending projections 
(uncoupling of the cortex from the activating input of the reticular formation).  
1.2. Clinical definition of unconsciousness 
1.2.1. Coma 
Coma is a state of unresponsiveness in which the patient lies with the eyes closed, cannot be 
aroused, and has no awareness of self and surroundings. Coma may result from bilateral 
diffuse cortical or white matter damage or brainstem lesions bilaterally, affecting the 
subcortical reticular arousing systems, or from sudden large unilateral lesions that 
functionally disrupt the contralateral hemisphere. Coma is distinguished from syncope or 
concussion in terms of its duration, which is at least 1h. In general, comatose patients who 
survive begin to awaken and recover gradually within 2–4 weeks (Plum and Posner, 1983). 
Many factors such as etiology, age, the patient’s general medical condition, clinical signs, 
and complementary examinations influence the management and prognosis of coma. 
Traumatic etiology is known to have a better outcome than non-traumatic anoxic cases.  
1.2.2. Vegetative state 
Patients in a vegetative state (VS) are awake but are unaware of themselves or their 
environment. The VS is usually caused by diffuse lesions on the gray and white matter. 
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Characterized by ‘wakefulness without awareness’, patients regain their sleep–wake cycle, 
and may be aroused by painful or salient stimuli, but show no unambiguous signs of 
conscious perception or deliberate action, including communicative acts.  
Persistent vegetative state (PVS) has been defined as a vegetative state remaining 1 month 
after acute traumatic or non-traumatic brain damage. It does not imply irreversibility. 
According to the Multi-Society Task Force on persistent vegetative state (PVS), the criteria 
for the diagnosis of VS are the following (1994): (1) no evidence of awareness of self or 
environment and an inability to interact with others; (2) no evidence of sustained, 
reproducible, purposeful, or voluntary behavioral responses to visual, auditory, tactile, or 
noxious stimuli; (3) no evidence of language comprehension or expression; (4) intermittent 
wakefulness manifested by the presence of sleep–wake cycles; (5) sufficiently preserved 
hypothalamic and brainstem autonomic functions to permit survival with medical and 
nursing care; (6) bowel and bladder incontinence; and (7) variably preserved cranial nerve 
and spinal reflexes. However, permanent vegetative state is irreversible. According to the 
Multi-Society Task Force on Permanent Vegetative State (1994), vegetative state may be 
regarded as permanent 3 months after non-traumatic brain damage or 12 months after 
traumatic injury. These guidelines are best applied to patients who have diffuse traumatic 
brain injuries and postanoxic events. Recovery from a vegetative state often occurs: younger 
age and a traumatic, rather than hypoxic–ischemic etiology.  
1.2.3. Minimally conscious state 
According to Giacino’s definition (Giacino et al. , 2002), the minimally conscious state 
(MCS) is a condition of severely altered consciousness in which limited but clearly 
discernible evidence of self or environmental awareness must be demonstrated on a 
reproducible or sustained basis by at least one of the following behaviors: (1) following 
simple commands; (2) gestural or verbal yes/no responses (regardless of accuracy); (3) 
intelligible verbalization; (4) purposeful behavior, including movements or affective 
behaviors that occur in contingent relation to relevant environmental stimuli and are not 
due to reflexive activity, such as, appropriate smiling or crying in response to the 
linguistic or visual content of emotional but not to neutral topics or stimuli; vocalizations 
or gestures that occur in direct response to the linguistic content of questions; reaching for 
objects that demonstrates a clear relationship between object location and direction of 
reach; touching or holding objects in a manner that accommodates the size and shape of 
the object; pursuit eye movement or sustained fixation that occurs in direct response to 
moving or salient stimuli.  
Like the VS, the MCS may be chronic and sometimes permanent. Emergence from the MCS 
is defined by the ability to exhibit functional interactive communication or functional use of 
objects. Similar to the VS, traumatic etiology has a better prognosis than non-traumatic 
anoxic brain injuries. Preliminary data show that the overall outcome in the MCS is more 
favorable than in the VS (Giacino and Whyte, 2005, Laureys et al. , 2004a).  
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1.2.4. Brain death 
Most countries have published recommendations for the diagnosis of brain death but the 
diagnostic criteria differ from country to country. Some rely on the death of the brainstem 
only; others require death of the whole brain including the brainstem. However, the clinical 
assessments for brain death are the same and require the loss of all brainstem reflexes and 
the demonstration of continuing apnea in a persistently comatose patient (Laureys, Owen, 
2004a). The central considerations in the diagnosis of brain death are: (1) absence of all 
cerebral functions; (2) absence of all brainstem functions, including spontaneous respiration; 
and (3) irreversibility of the state (Ropper and Brown, 2005). At present, no recovery from 
brain death has been reported.  
1.2.5. Locked-in syndrome 
The locked-in syndrome (LIS), characterized by anarthria and quadriplegia with general 
preservation of cognition, must be distinguished from disorders of consciousness. The 
locked-in syndrome describes patients who are awake and conscious, but have no means of 
producing speech, limb, or facial movements, resembling patients in VS, and is most often 
caused by a lesion of the ventral pons (basis pontis) as a result of basilar artery occlusion. 
Locked-in syndrome is defined by sustained eye opening (bilateral ptosis should be ruled 
out as a complicating factor), awareness of the environment, aphonia or hypophonia, 
quadriplegia or quadriparesis, and vertical or lateral eye movement or blinking of the upper 
eyelid to signal yes/no responses (Giacino et al. , 1995). Eye or eyelid movements are the 
main method of communication. Since there is only motor output problem, LIS is not a 
disorder of consciousness (DOC).  
Table 1 outlines the clinical features of disorders of consciousness and the locked-in 
syndrome. 
1.3. Epidemiology of unconsciousness 
Three categories of disorder can cause VS: acute traumatic and non-traumatic brain injuries; 
degenerative and metabolic brain disorders, and severe congenital malformations of the 
nervous system. However, the most common cause of VS and MCS is traumatic brain injury. 
Non-traumatic causes in adults include acute hypoxic-ischemic neuronal injury suffered 
during cardiopulmonary arrest, stroke, and meningoencephalitis (Tresch et al. , 1991). For 
children, causes of VS include trauma, meningitis, asphyxia, congenital malformations, and 
perinatal injuries (Ashwal et al. , 1992).  
The Multi-society Task Force claimed that in the USA there are 10,000–25,000 adults and 
4,000-10,000 children (about 56-140 per million) in a PVS (1994). This estimate was almost 
certainly high given that their prevalence model assumed that many patients with 
neurodegenerative diseases eventually progressed to a vegetative state and that many 
children were in a vegetative state from developmental malformations. According to an 
epidemiological survey of persistent vegetative state and minimally conscious state in 
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Austria, the point prevalence was 33.6 patients per million for VS and 15 per million for 
MCS in long-term care facilities (Donis and Kraftner, 2011). Without reliable epidemiologic 
measures, patients in MCS remain silent victims, unheard and uncounted.  
 
Clinical feature Coma Vegetative state 
Minimally conscious 
state
Locked-in 
syndrome 
Consciousness None None Partial Full
Sleep/wake  Absent Present Present Present 
Motor function 
Reflex 
and 
postural 
responses 
only 
Postures or 
withdraws to 
noxious stimuli 
Occasional 
nonpurposeful 
movement 
Localizes noxious 
stimuli 
Reaches for objects 
Holds or touches 
objects in a manner 
that accommodates 
size and shape 
Automatic movements 
(e.g., scratching)
Quadriplegic 
Auditory 
function 
None 
Startle 
Brief orienting to 
sound 
Localizes sound 
location 
Inconsistent command 
following
Preserved 
Visual function None 
Startle 
Brief visual 
fixation 
Sustained visual 
fixation 
Sustained visual 
pursuit
Preserved 
Communication None None 
Contingent 
vocalization 
Inconsistent but 
intelligible 
verbalization or 
gesture
Aphonic/Anarthric 
Vertical eye 
movement and 
blinking usually 
intact 
Emotion None 
None
Reflexive crying 
or smiling
Contingent smiling or 
crying 
Preserved 
Quotes from Giacino JT, Ashwal S, Childs N, Cranford R, Jennett B, Katz DI, et al. The minimally conscious state: 
definition and diagnostic criteria. Neurology. 2002;58:349-53. 
Table 1. Clinical features of disorders of consciousness and the locked-in syndrome 
Patients with MCS may follow a survival time course distinguishable from other brain-
injured patients. It has been suggested that patients in VS due to TBI have a lower mortality 
rate and longer survival compared with those with anoxia (Childs et al. , 1993). Survival in 
MCS depends on age; quality of care; comorbid illness and injury; and decisions to withhold 
or withdraw life-sustaining therapy. Survival estimates with severe brain injury are variable 
(Fins et al. , 2007). Young patients with MCS retain limited mobility and have longer life 
spans; 81% have an 8-year survival (Childs, Mercer, 1993). 
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2. Clinical assessment methods of unconsciousness 
The assessment and prognosis of unconsciousness currently depends mainly on clinical 
scales and experience. The limitations of those scales are obvious. Subtle changes in levels of 
unconsciousness cannot be clearly and accurately captured, but depend greatly on the 
experience of the examiner (Stevens and Bhardwaj, 2006). Clinical commonly used scales of 
unconsciousness, such as the Glasgow Coma Scale (GCS), Rappaport Coma/Near-Coma 
Scale and JFK Coma Recovery Scale would be introduced as follows.  
2.1. Glasgow Coma Scale (GCS) 
The GCS is used to assess the level of consciousness after head injury and is now applicable 
to all acute medical and trauma patients. The scale comprises three tests: eye, verbal  
and motor responses. The three values separately as well as their sum are considered. The 
lowest possible GCS (the sum) is 3 (deep coma or death), while the highest is 15 (fully  
awake person).  
The GCS, which was developed, validated, and used widely to assess the level of 
consciousness and prognosis of patients with acute traumatic brain injuries (Rowley and 
Fielding, 1991) and non-traumatic causes of coma (Mullie et al. , 1988), is insufficient for the 
assessment of vegetative state and minimally conscious state because of its crude 
measurement of awareness and its omission of relevant neurological functions (Howard and 
Hirsch, 1999). 
 
Eye Response 
Does not open eyes 1 point 
Opens eyes in response to painful stimuli 2 points 
Opens eyes in response to voice 3 points 
Opens eyes spontaneously 4 points 
Verbal Response 
Makes no sounds 1 point 
Incomprehensible sounds 2 points 
Utters inappropriate words 3 points 
Confused, disoriented 4 points 
Oriented, converses normally 5 points 
Motor Response 
Makes no movements 1 point 
Extension to painful stimuli (decerebrate response) 2 points 
Abnormal flexion to painful stimuli (decorticate response) 3 points 
Flexion / Withdrawal to painful stimuli 4 points 
Localizes painful stimuli 5 points 
Obeys commands 6 points 
Table 2. Glasgow Coma Scale (GCS) 
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2.2. Rappaport coma/Near-coma scale 
The Coma/Near Coma (CNC) scale was developed to measure small clinical changes in 
patients with severe brain injuries who function at very low levels characteristic of near-
vegetative and vegetative states. The CNC was designed to provide reliable, valid, easy, and 
quick assessment of progress or lack of progress in low-level brain injured patients. The 
CNC has five levels, based on 11 items that can be scored to indicate severity of sensory, 
perceptual, and primitive response deficits. For the details, See Rappaport, M. (2000). The 
Coma/Near Coma Scale. The Center for Outcome Measurement in Brain Injury. http://www.tbims. 
org/combi/cnc (accessed October 1, 2011).  
2.3. JFK Coma Recovery Scale-Revised 
The JFK Coma Recovery Scale-Revised (CRS-R) comprises 6 subscales addressing auditory, 
visual, motor, oromotor/verbal, communication, and arousal processes. Scoring is based on 
the presence or absence of specific behavioral responses to sensory stimuli administered in a 
standardized manner. The lowest item on each subscale represents reflexive activity or no 
response, whereas the highest items represent cognitively mediated behaviors.  
The CRS-R appears to meet minimal standards for measurement and evaluation tools 
designed for use in interdisciplinary medical rehabilitation. The scale can be administered 
reliably by trained examiners and produces reasonably stable scores over repeated 
assessments. Diagnostic application of the CRS-R suggests that the scale is capable of 
discriminating patients in an MCS from those in VS (Giacino et al. , 2004).  
According to the report of a systematic review of behavioral assessment scales for disorders of 
consciousness (DOC), the CRS-R has excellent content validity and is the only scale to address 
all Aspen Workgroup criteria and may be used to assess DOC with minor reservations, while 
CNC may be used to assess DOC with major reservations (Seel et al. , 2010).  
3. Functional neuroimaging and unconsciousness 
Although bedside clinical assessment examination remains the criterion standard for 
establishing diagnosis in clinical practice, behavioral findings are often limited or 
ambiguous. Recently, the evidence from the non-invasive functional imaging techniques, 
especially functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and positron emission 
tomography (PET) provided clues to brain function in unconscious populations, suggests 
that some patients with DOC exhibit partially preserved conscious processing despite 
having no clinical or verbal output (Owen et al. , 2006) and may serve an adjunctive and 
useful information to the diagnosis and prognosis of these patients. 
Recent advances in functional neuroimaging use so-called ‘activation’ studies to assess 
residual brain function in altered states of consciousness without the need for any overt 
response on the part of the patient. fMRI can capture precisely and visualize localized 
physiologic change in the brain induced by neuronal activity. Several fMRI and PET 
findings demonstrated that some MCS or VS patients retain islands of preserved cognitive, 
sensory and auditory function.  
 
Advances in Clinical Neurophysiology 38 
Auditory Function Scale 
Consistent Movement to Command* 4 
Reproducible Movement to Command* 3 
Localization to Sound 2 
Auditory Startle 1 
None 0 
Visual Function Scale 
Object Recognition* 5 
Object Localization: Reaching* 4 
Visual Pursuit* 3 
Fixation* 2 
Visual Startle 1 
None 0 
Motor Function Scale 
Functional Object Use† 6 
Automatic Motor Response* 5 
Object Manipulation* 4 
Localization to Noxious Stimulation* 3 
Flexion Withdrawal 2 
Abnormal Posturing 1 
None/Flaccid 0 
Oromotor/Verbal Function Scale 
Intelligible Verbalization* 3 
Vocalization/Oral Movement 2 
Oral Reflexive Movement 1 
None 0 
Communication Scale 
Oriented† 3 
Functional: Accurate† 2 
Non-Functional: Intentional* 1 
None 0 
Arousal Scale 
Attention* 3 
Eye Opening without Stimulation 2 
Eye Opening with Stimulation 1 
Unarousable 0 
*Denotes MCS.  
Denotes emergence from MCS.  
Table 3. JFK Coma Recovery Scale-Revised (CRS-R) 
The VS patients show cortical activation limited to ‘lower level’ primary cortical areas. 
Noxious somatosensory stimulation, such as high-intensity electric stimulation of the 
median nerve at the wrist, induced activation of midbrain, contralateral thalamus, and 
primary somatosensory cortex. The somatosensory cortex was functionally disconnected 
from ‘higher order’ associative cortical areas, encompassing anterior cingulate, insular, 
prefrontal and posterior parietal cortices. In healthy controls, such stimuli activated primary 
and secondary somatosensory cortices, bilateral insular, posterior parietal and anterior 
cingulate cortices (Laureys et al. , 2002). In line with the results of the somatosensory 
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activation study described above, the activated primary auditory cortex by auditory 
stimulation was also functionally disconnected from higher order areas encompassing 
posterior parietal, anterior cingulate and hippocampal areas, whereas in control subjects, 
stimuli activated bilateral primary and contralateral auditory association cortices (Boly et 
al. , 2004, Laureys et al. , 2000). Likewise, visual stimulation elicited activation in primary 
visual cortex (Giacino et al. , 2006). These studies support the view that simple 
somatosensory, auditory and visual stimuli typically activate primary cortices in patients 
with VS and fail to show robust activation in higher order associative cortices.  
It is important to differentiate a patient in PVS from a patient in MCS, as the latter patient 
has a much higher chance of a favorable outcome. Some MCS patients may retain widely 
distributed cortical systems with potential for cognitive and sensory function, despite their 
inability to follow simple instructions or communicate reliably (Schiff et al. , 2005). PET and 
fMRI case reports incorporating complex auditory stimuli have shown large-scale network 
activation in the minimally conscious state that is not observed in unconscious vegetative 
patients (Bekinschtein et al. , 2005, Laureys et al. , 2004b).  
However, it remains controversial whether the VS patients with atypical ‘higher order’ 
associative cortical activation have a good outcome. In some fMRI or/and PET studies, patients 
with higher-level associative cortical activation in VS progressed to MCS or recovered 
consciousness (Bekinschtein, Tiberti, 2005, Coleman et al. , 2007, Di et al. , 2007), which seem to 
show that atypical ‘higher order’ associative cortical activation in VS heralds recovery of some 
level of consciousness some months later. Other VS patients with ‘higher level’ associative 
cortical activation failed to subsequently recover (Staffen et al. , 2006), which was in line with 
the viewpoint that VS patients with atypical behavioral fragments can show residual isolated 
brain processing in the absence of clinical recovery (Schiff et al. , 2002) .  
Functional connectivity of the brain, measured with fMRI techniques, seems to play a more 
important role for consciousness. Recently, the brain activity fluctuations in the default 
resting state have received increasing interest. The default mode network is defined as a set 
of areas encompassing the posterior-cingulate/precuneus, anterior cingulated/mesiofrontal 
cortex and temporo-parietal junctions, showing more activity at rest than during attention-
demanding tasks. Some studies on resting state activity in DOC show that functional 
connectivity is disrupted in the task-negative or the default mode network. Cauda et al. 
studied three patients in a vegetative state, found the decreased connectivity in several brain 
regions, including the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and anterior cingulated cortex, 
especially in the right hemisphere, the results showed a dysfunctional default mode 
network (Cauda et al. , 2009). Boly et al. demonstrated absent cortico-thalamic functional 
connectivity but partially preserved cortico-cortical connectivity within the default network 
in a vegetative state patient following cardio-respiratory arrest (Boly et al. , 2009). In this 
patient, anticorrelations could also be observed between the posterior cingulate/precuneus 
and a previously identified task-positive cortical network, but both correlations and anti-
correlations were significantly reduced as compared to healthy controls. In the same study, 
a brain death patient studied two days after a massive cranial hemorrhage and evolution to 
a comatose state showed no residual functional connectivity (Boly, Tshibanda, 2009). In a 
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more comprehensive study, fourteen non-communicative brain-damaged patients and 
fourteen healthy controls participated in a resting state fMRI protocol. Functional 
connectivity in all default network areas was found to be non-linearly correlated with the 
degree of consciousness, ranging from healthy volunteers and locked-in syndrome, to 
minimally conscious, vegetative and comatose patients. Furthermore, connectivity in the 
precuneus was found to be significantly stronger in MCS patients compared with VS patients, 
while locked-in syndrome patients’ default network connectivity was shown to be not 
significantly different from that of healthy control subjects (Vanhaudenhuyse et al. , 2010). 
Certainly, the two main approaches, hypothesis-driven seed-voxel and data-driven 
independent component analysis, employed in the analysis of resting state functional 
connectivity data present multiple methodological difficulties, especially in non-
collaborative DOC patients. Improvements in motion artifact removal and spatial 
normalization are needed before fMRI resting state data can be used as proper biomarkers 
in severe brain injury.  
In a word, we can only say functional imaging activation studies can provide valuable 
prognostic information, and future efforts should be needed.  
4. Evoked potentials (EPs) and unconsciousness 
4.1. Auditory evoked potentials (AEPs) and unconsciousness 
Auditory evoked potentials (AEPs) can be used to trace the signal generated by a sound 
through the ascending auditory pathway. The evoked potential is generated in the cochlea, 
goes through the cochlear nerve, through the cochlear nucleus, superior olivary complex, 
lateral lemniscus, to the inferior colliculi in the midbrain, on to the medial geniculate body, 
and finally to the cortex. Brainstem auditory-evoked potentials (BAEPs) do not play a role in 
the prognosis for awakening, but only play a prognostic role in survival (Lew et al. , 2003, 
Young et al. , 2004).  
A study of long-latency responses (LLRs) reported that a P300 component was observed in 
response to the patient's name in all patients with locked-in syndrome, in all MCS patients, 
and in 3 of 5 patients in VS. However, a P300 response does not necessarily reflect conscious 
perception and cannot be used to differentiate VS from MCS patients (Perrin et al. , 2006). 
Another study also demonstrated that MCS patients presented a larger P300 to the patient's 
own name, in the passive and in the active conditions. Moreover, the P300 to target stimuli 
was higher in the active than in the passive condition, suggesting voluntary compliance to 
task instructions like controls. In contrast, no P300s were observed for VS patients in 
response to their own name (Schnakers et al. , 2008). In conclusion, auditory LLRs are 
clinically useful for assessment of higher-order neural functions and processing in TBI 
patients. Auditory P300 protocols can be used to assess cognitive functions in this 
population (Folmer et al. , 2011).  
Mismatch Negativity (MMN) is generated by the brain’s automatic response to physical 
stimulus deviation from the preceding stimulus in repetitive auditory input, revealing that 
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physical features of auditory stimuli are fully processed regardless whether they are 
attended to or not (Naatanen et al. , 2004). The auditory MMN (which can occur in response 
to deviance in pitch, intensity, or duration) is a fronto-central negative potential with 
primary generators in auditory cortex and a typical latency of 150–250ms after the onset of 
the deviant stimulus. Neural generators of the MMN might also include frontal cortex and 
thalamus (Naatanen et al. , 2007). Fischer et al. studied a series of 346 comatose patients and 
found that the presence of MMN is a predictor of awakening and precludes comatose 
patients from moving to a permanent vegetative state (Fischer et al. , 2004). Mismatch 
negativity has repeatedly shown to predict outcome after coma demonstrated that in the 
acute phase the presence of MMN predicted the exclusion of shifting into PVS. In the study 
of Kotchoubey et al., 6 months after the brain insult clinical improvement was observed 
more frequently in VS and MCS patients with a significant MMN than in those without the 
MMN (Kotchoubey et al. , 2005). Wijnen et al. recorded MMNs from 10 patients in VS every 
2 weeks for an average period of 3.5 months and observed that with recovery to 
consciousness MMN-amplitudes increased and a sudden increase was seen in MMN 
amplitude when patients started to show inconsistent behavioral responses to simple 
commands. Thus, they concluded that MMN can be helpful in identifying the ability to 
recover from VS. Compared the prognostic value of MMN to auditory P300 elicited by the 
patient's own name, the use of novelty P3 elicited by the patient's name increases the 
prognostic value of MMN alone and improves the assessment of comatose patients by 
demonstrating the activation of higher-level cognitive functions (Fischer et al. , 2008). 
Moreover, a meta-analysis of Daltrozzo et al. indicated that MMN and P300 appeared to be 
reliable predictors of awakening in low-responsive patients with stroke or hemorrhage, 
trauma and metabolic encephalopathy etiologies (Daltrozzo et al. , 2007).  
4.2. Somatosensory Evoked Potentials (SEPs) and unconsciousness 
Somatosensory Evoked Potentials (SEPs) can trace the conduction of a sensory impulse 
(initiated by touch, painful stimuli, or mild electrical stimulation of the skin) from a patient's 
leg or wrist, through the limb and spinal column, and to record its arrival in contralateral 
somatosensory cortex. Short-latency somatosensory evoked potentials (SSEPs) refer to the 
primary response from the somatosensory cortex (S1).  
Many studies have confirmed that the absence of cortical somatosensory-evoked potentials 
(SSEPs) such as N20 is good evidence to predict recovery from coma (Amantini et al. , 2005, 
Carter and Butt, 2005, Robinson et al. , 2003, Young, Wang, 2004). Lew et al. studied 22 
patients who suffered severe TBI and observed that bilateral absence of median nerve SEP 
was strongly predictive of the worst functional outcome (Lew, Dikmen, 2003). However, 
these studies mainly focused on acute brain injury. Prolonged impaired consciousness (MCS 
and VS) have not been studied in such detail. Wu et al. studied 21 subjects in PVS and 16 in 
MCS and founded that SSEPs failed to distinguished subjects in PVS from those in MCS, 
which indicated that this measure might be limited in predicting outcome in this population 
(Wu et al. , 2011a).  
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5. EEG (traditional methods) and unconsciousness 
Electroencephalography (EEG) can also provide a direct and dynamic measurement of 
electrical brain activity induced by neuronal functional activity in the cortex. EEG allows for 
an immediate examination of cortical or cortical–subcortical dysfunction in an inexpensive, 
safe, and readily available manner. It is an important tool in assessing unconscious patients.  
5.1. Several scoring systems for grading the severity of EEG abnormalities 
Changes in EEG patterns may indicate either deepening or lightening of coma, though 
orderly progression of coma through various EEG patterns does not always occur. 
Researchers have already agreed the following EEG patterns found after cardiac arrest are 
strongly associated with an poor neurologic outcome: generalized suppression; generalized 
burst–suppression; generalized periodic patterns, especially with epileptiform activity; and 
α- or α-/θ-pattern coma (Young, 2000).  
Synek developed one of the first EEG classification systems for comatose patients (Synek, 
1988). Table 4 lists the Synek EEG Classification System. In his view, favorable outcome with 
survival seems to occur with both grade 1 and the "reactive type" of grade 2 abnormalities, 
with preservation of normal sleep features, and with frontal mono-rhythmic delta activity; 
prognostically uncertain patterns are "nonreactive" grade 2 abnormalities; diffuse delta 
activity with grade 3 abnormality, and the "reactive type of alpha pattern coma."; the 
following patterns are suggested to be prognostically malignant if persistent: grade 3 
abnormality with small amplitude, diffuse, irregular delta activity; grade 4 ("burst 
suppression pattern"), in particular when epileptiform discharges are present and with 
"low-output EEG"; and grade 5 ("isoelectric EEG"); fatal outcome is also common with the 
"nonreactive type of alpha pattern coma" and the recently reported "theta pattern coma." 
 
Grade Subgrade Subsubgrade 
I (Regular alpha, some theta -
reactive) 
  
II (predominant theta) 
a. normal voltage, reactive
b. low voltage, nonreactive
 
III (delta/spindles) 
a. predominant delta, widespread, 
rhythmic, reactive 
b. spindle coma 
c. predominant delta, low voltage, 
irregular, nonreactive 
d. predominant delta, medium 
voltage, usually nonreactive
 
IV (Burst suppression/alpha 
coma/theta coma/low voltage 
delta) 
a. burst suppression 
b. alpha pattern coma 
c. theta pattern coma 
d. <20μV delta 
(1) epileptiform activity 
(2) no epileptiform 
activity 
(1) some reactivity 
(2) no reactivity 
V (Suppression) Electrocerebral silence (<2μV)
Table 4. Synek (1988) EEG Classification System 
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Young et al. suggested a revised EEG Classification System (Young et al. , 1997). Table 5 lists 
the Young EEG Classification System. This system for classifying EEGs in comatose patients 
has a higher inter-observer reliability than the Synek’s.  
 
Category Subcategory
I Delta/theta > 50% of recording (not theta coma) 
(1) Reactivity
(2) No reactivity
II Triphasic waves
III Burst-suppression 
(1) With epileptiform activity 
(2)Without epileptiform activity 
IV Alpha/theta/spindle coma (unreactive)
V Epileptiform activity (not in burst-suppression 
pattern) 
(1) Generalized
(2) Focal or multifocal
VI Suppression 
(1) <20μV, but > 10μV
(2) ≤10μV
Guideline: 
1. Burst-suppression pattern should have generalized flattening at standard sensitivity 
for ≥ 1 second at least every 20 seconds. 
2. Suppression: for this category, voltage criteria should be met for the entire record; 
there should be no reactivity. 
3. When > 1 category applies, select the most critical: 
• Suppression is the most serious category. 
• Burst-suppression pattern is more important than the category of triphasic waves 
which is more significant than dysrhythmia or delta. 
• Alpha pattern coma is more important than focal spikes, triphasic waves, 
dysrhythmia or delta categories. 
Table 5. Young (1997) EEG Classification System 
Husain presented a review of the EEG patterns commonly seen in coma (Husain, 2006). In 
this review, the author suggested that intermittent rhythmic delta activity (IRDA, consisting 
of 2 to 3 Hz sinusoidal waves occurring in a rhythmic but intermittent manner), triphasic 
waves (TW, blunt, delta (2 to 3 Hz) waves which consist of a high-voltage positive wave 
preceded and followed by lower amplitude negative waves) are seen in lighter stages of 
coma; continuous high-voltage delta activity has a poorer outcome than IRDA and TW; 
periodic lateralized epileptiform discharges (PLEDs), the prognosis depends on their 
etiology: those related to seizures often have a favorable outcome, whereas those due to 
infection and stroke have a more variable prognosis; generalized periodic epileptiform 
discharges (GPEDs), the prognosis depends on their etiology: if the GPEDs are due to 
medication overdose, outcome may be good, whereas the etiology is anoxia, outcome is 
usually poor; burst-suppression (generalized, synchronous bursts of high-voltage, mixed-
frequency activity alternating with periods of suppression of EEG activity), prognosis is 
greatly dependent on etiology: patients manifesting this pattern after cardiac arrest are 
likely to have a much worse outcome; Low-voltage, slow, non-reactive EEG (the 
predominant activity is of theta and delta frequencies and the amplitude is less than 20μV) 
and electrocerebral inactivity (ECI), the prognosis is poor; spindle coma, the prognosis is 
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often favorable; alpha coma, the etiology due to cardiorespiratory arrest is poor, due to toxic 
encephalopathy is favorable, and due to locked-in syndrome is poor; beta coma, the most 
common cause for beta coma is overdose of sedative-hypnotic medications and the 
prognosis is usually favorable.  
5.2. Quantitative EEG and unconsciousness 
Signal processing and computer technology have enabled the quantification of conventional 
electroencephalogram (EEG) findings. Digital EEG is paperless recording, storage and 
display with many advantages over traditional paper recordings. Quantitative EEG (QEEG) 
is any mathematical or statistical analysis along with the various graphical displays made 
from digital EEG. The most commonly used method is frequency spectrum analysis based 
on fast Fourier transform.  
Most subjects in VS have profound generalized slowing of background activity with delta 
rhythms that do not react to stimuli; subjects with the most severe forms of VS show 
electrocerebral silence (Bernat, 2006). Most subjects in MCS show diffuse slowing in the 
theta or delta range (Giacino and Whyte, 2005), or in the theta or slow alpha (7.5–8 Hz) 
range (Fingelkurts et al., 2012, Kotchoubey, Lang, 2005). Since the spectrum of EEG 
malignant categories (suppression, burst-suppression, alpha and theta coma, and 
generalized periodic complexes combined) is greatly variable (Young, 2000), it is difficult to 
quantify different EEG features of malignant categories. Certain EEG features are associated 
with a poor outcome and, in some cases, useful in predicting eventual survival. However, 
the predictive value of individual classifications has not been adequately addressed 
(Husain, 2006, Young, 2000).   
5.3. Other EEG analytical methods and unconsciousness 
Other QEEG techniques include: monitoring and trending, source analysis, coherence 
analysis, EEG brain maps, et al. Coherence analysis, defined as a statistical measure of cross-
correlation between two EEG signals in the frequency domain, and associated with 
functional coupling, is another commonly used method. Kane et al. investigated the 
relationship between quantitative EEG and BAEP measures and outcome, in 60 comatose 
patients after severe, closed head injury and the result indicated that there was regional 
information in EEG power spectra over the left hemisphere, which could be used in 
prognostic predictions for patients in coma after severe TBI (Kane et al. , 1998). Leon-Carrion 
et al. studied 7 MCS patients and 9 patients with severe neurocognitive disorders and the 
results stressed the importance of fronto-temporal-parietal associative cortices within the 
"awareness-regions" model and also suggest a relation between excess of slow wave activity 
and diminished level of awareness in brain injury population (Leon-Carrion et al. , 2008).  
6. Nonlinear dynamics analysis (NDA) and unconsciousness 
During the past two decades, nonlinear dynamics analysis (NDA) has become a common 
way to study neural mechanisms underlying cognition. The EEG is complex and of limited 
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predictability because its ultra-high-dimensional nature makes it in essence a stochastic 
system (Jansen, 1991, Pritchard and Duke, 1995). NDA can characterize the dynamics of the 
neural networks underlying the EEG (Jelles et al. , 1999). Thus, it is suggested that NDA 
provides a useful tool for studying dynamic changes and abstracting correlations within 
cortical networks, such as the degree of synchronization within local neural networks and 
the coupling between distant cortical neural networks. NDA is derived from the 
mathematical theory of nonlinear dynamical systems. NDA has demonstrated that the 
decreased complexity of EEG patterns and reduced functional connections in the cerebral 
cortex likely are due to decreased nonlinear cell-dynamics as well as linear and nonlinear 
couplings between cortical areas (Jeong, 2004).  
6.1. Principles of different NDA methods 
6.1.1. Lempel-Ziv complexity (LZC) 
Lempel and Ziv proposed a useful complexity measure that characterizes degrees of order 
in and development of spatiotemporal patterns. Lempel-Ziv complexity (LZC) quantifies the 
complexity of time series and is well suited to the analysis of non-stationary biomedical 
signals of short length. Several studies showed that C(n) (a nonlinear index of complexity) is 
a useful and promising EEG-derived parameter for characterizing the depth of anesthesia 
(Zhang et al. , 2001). 
LZC analysis is based upon a coarse-graining of the measurements, such that the EEG time 
series must be transformed into a finite symbol sequence. To do this, we used a simple 
binary sequence conversion (zeros and ones): Data values below or equal the mean of the 
given sequence were assigned the symbol “0,” and the values above the mean were assigned 
the symbol “1”. This algorithm gives the number of distinct patterns contained in the given 
finite sequence S=s1, s2, …, sn.  
Once digitized, the EEG sequences were scanned according to the method of Kaspar and 
Schuster (Kaspar and Schuster, 1987). The corresponding complexity measure, c(n) 
increased by 1 unit when a new subsequence pattern was found in the process, and the next 
symbol was regarded as the beginning of the next subsequence pattern. The pattern 
searching continued until the last symbol was scanned. For instance, a time series of EEG 
signal (6.65, 2.63, 7.15, 1.04, 1.68, 5.55, 3.67, 4.51,… ) whose average was 4.11 could be 
converted into a binary sequence, 10100101…; c(n) of the binary sequence was 4, since 
different patterns observed in it were 1, 0, 100 and 101. More details of the LZC calculation 
can be found in the literature (Kaspar and Schuster, 1987, Zhang, Roy, 2001).  
In order to obtain a complexity measure that is independent of the sequence length, c(n) was 
normalized. For a binary conversion, Lempel and Ziv (Lempel and Ziv, 1976) demonstrated 
that: 
2
lim ( ) ( )
log ( )n
n
c n b n
n→∞
= ≡  
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such that c(n) could be normalized via b(n): 
( )
( )
c n
LZC
b n
=  
LZC usually ranges between zero and one. It is a nonlinear dynamic measure indicating the 
rate of appearance of the new patterns in a time series. A larger LZC implies a greater 
chance of the occurrence of new sequence patterns and thus a more complex dynamical 
behavior (Li et al. , 2008). LZC can be viewed as independent of number of samples when n 
is large (Zhang, Roy, 2001).  
In Fig. 1, we present the four LZC analysis steps. The first step consisted in a pre-processing of 
the signals: artifact-free epoch selection and band-pass filtering. In the second step, the EEG 
data was transformed into a binary sequence through so-called coarse-graining procedure. The 
third step was subsequence pattern finding, used to estimate the complexity of the binary 
sequence – c(n). Finally, the normalized LZ complexity of the signals was calculated.  
 
Figure 1. Block diagram of the steps followed in the LZC analysis: signal pre-processing, binarization, 
subsequence pattern finding and LZC calculation.  
6.1.2. Approximate entropy (ApEn) 
Entropy, when considered as a physical concept, is related to the amount of “disorder” in 
the system. Approximate entropy can quantify the irregularity of data time series, i.e., the 
predictability of subsequent amplitude values based upon the knowledge of the previous 
amplitude values. Entropy of the EEG measures the regularity of the signal: high levels of 
entropy during anesthesia demonstrate that the subject is awake, whereas low levels of 
entropy correlate with deeper unconsciousness (Anderson et al. , 2004, Bruhn et al. , 2003, 
Hans et al. , 2005, Vakkuri et al. , 2004).  
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Approximate entropy is a measure of system complexity that was proposed by Pincus and 
Singer (Pincus and Singer, 1996). It is computed as follows:  
1( , , ) lim [ ( ) ( )]m m
N
ApEn m r N r r+
→∞
= φ − φ  
1
1
1
( ) ln ( )
1
N m
m m
i
i
r C r
N m
− +
=
φ =
− +
  
where C is the correlation integral. 
The absolute value of approximate entropy is influenced by three parameters: the length of 
the epoch (N), the number of previous values used for the prediction of the subsequent 
value (m), and a filtering level (r). The noise filter defines the tolerance r that discerns 
“close” and “not close” subvectors of length “N.”  “r” measures the amount of noise in the 
data that is filtered out in the ensuing calculation.  
ApEn calibrates an extent of serial interrelationships, quantifying a continuum that ranges 
from totally ordered (zero) to completely random (infinite). It assigns a non-negative 
number to a time series, with larger values corresponding to more complexity or irregularity 
in the data (Pincus, 2001). With increasing irregularity, knowing past values will not enable 
reliable prediction of future values, and approximate entropy will increase. Thus, decreasing 
irregularity (decreased ApEn) will cause lowered complexity in the time series, i.e. reduced 
nonlinear cell-dynamics or interaction of cortical networks. 
6.1.3. Cross aproximate entropy (C-ApEn) 
Cross approximate entropy (C-ApEn) measures the degree of dissimilarity between two 
concurrent series. A thematically similar quantification of two-variable asynchrony can aid in 
uncovering subtle disruptions in complicated network dynamics (Pincus, 2006). It is a recently 
introduced technique for analyzing two related time series to measure the degree of their 
asynchrony. C-ApEn is very similar to ApEn in design and intent, differing only in that it 
compares sequences from one series with those of the second (Richman and Moorman, 2000). 
Given two time series of N points, 
{ } { }( );1    and  ( );1u j j N v j j N≤ ≤ ≤ ≤  
form the vectors 
{ }
{ }
( ) ( ) : 0 1
( ) ( ) : 0 1
m
m
x i u i k k m
y i v i k k m
= + ≤ ≤ −
= + ≤ ≤ −
 
in which, u and v are the time series, m is the dimension of the vector, r is the same 
threshold used in the definition of ApEn, and N is the length of the time series. The distance 
between two such vectors is defined: 
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Lastly, the estimated approximate entropy of finite series is:  
1( , , )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )m mCross ApEn m r N v u r v u r v u+− = −  φ φ  
While the single-channel ApEn measures the temporal complexity of the EEG, the two-
channel C-ApEn reflects the spatial decorrelation of cortical potentials from two remote sites 
(Hudetz, 2002). Since conscious cognitive processes depend on functional brain regions 
networks, C-ApEn could reflect the general state of functional connectivity of the brain that 
supports conscious processes. 
What does raised C-ApEn mean about inter-cortical functional connectivity? This question 
is of great importance. According to Hudetz and Sleigh’s explanation, EEG entropy should 
not be viewed simply as an indicator of disorder, but as a measure of the number of possible 
microstates a cortical neuronal network may access. The greater the number of microstates, 
the higher the informational content they represent (Hudetz, 2002, Sleigh et al. , 2001). 
Therefore, C-ApEn may be interpreted as a measure of the number of states independently 
accessible by the two cortical areas. Thus, an increase in C-ApEn during painful or auditory 
stimuli may indicate not only an increase in the number of independent microstates 
available for the two cortical areas, but also increased inter-cortical communication or 
information flow (Wu et al. , 2011b).  
6.2. Clinical application of NDA correlated with unconsciousness 
NDA also can quantify the depth of anesthesia and sedation, and has been shown to be a 
sensitive and agent-specific correlate of the central effects of anesthetics. Researchers have 
demonstrated that LZC and ApEn can distinguish between awake and anaesthetized state 
of human subjects (Anderson, Barr, 2004, Bruhn, Bouillon, 2003, Ferenets et al. , 2006, 
Ferenets et al. , 2007, Hans, Dewandre, 2005, Kumar et al. , 2007, Noh et al. , 2006, Vakkuri, 
Yli-Hankala, 2004, Voss et al. , 2006, Zhang, Roy, 2001). In sleep research ApEn was 
statistically significantly lower during Stage IV and higher during wake and REM sleep 
(Burioka et al. , 2005, Papadelis et al. , 2007).  
6.3. Application of NDA in assessing unconsciousness 
Wu et al. studied 21 patients in PVS, 16 in MCS and 30 normal conscious subjects (control 
group) with brain trauma or stroke. EEG was recorded under three conditions: eyes closed, 
auditory stimuli and painful stimuli. EEG nonlinear indices such as Lempel-Ziv complexity 
(LZC), approximate entropy (ApEn) and cross-approximate entropy (C-ApEn) were calculated 
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for all subjects. The results showed that the PVS subjects had the lowest nonlinear indices, 
followed by the MCS subjects, and the control group had the highest; the PVS and MCS group 
had poorer response to auditory and painful stimuli than the control group; Under painful 
stimuli, nonlinear indices of subjects who recovered (REC) increased more significantly than 
non-REC subjects. The author considered that with EEG nonlinear analysis, the degree of 
suppression for PVS and MCS could be quantified and the changes of brain function for 
unconscious subjects could be captured by NDA. The possible mechanism might be that 
recovery of unconsciousness and the degree of suppression of unconsciousness are mediated 
through the brain cortex; NDA can reflect different levels of consciousness by measuring the 
complexity of the neuron networks in the brain cortex (Wu, Cai, 2011a).  
 
Figure 2. Schematic diagram of local and distant C-ApEn pairs. 
Further study with C-ApEn was carried out to investigate the cortical response to painful 
and auditory stimuli for subjects in PVS and MCS, and measure the interconnection of the 
residual cortical functional islands. The results showed that interconnection of local and 
distant cortical networks of patients in PVS was generally suppressed, and painful or 
auditory stimulation could hardly cause any activation of associative cortices; instead, 
interconnection of local cortical networks of patients in MCS improved significantly; the 
only significant difference with the normal conscious subjects existed in the unaffected 
distant cortical networks. The author also present some question: does raised C-ApEn of 
patients in VS and MCS under various stimulation conditions mean a better prognosis? 
Could C-ApEn be used as a feedback index of such resuscitation therapies as repetitive 
transcranial magnetic stimulation (rTMS) and transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) 
that could increase the excitability of cortical regions of interest? Further research is needed 
to answer these questions (Wu, Cai, 2011b).  
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